An economy is not affected in any materml i~ayby new technolo~until the use or o~~-nership Orthat technoiog IS\videspread. Slonemmt ( 1983. p.65) B> not~the tale of an invention made m the L'Sbut reaching its full potential oni> in o[iler courttr[es is an oft-told one: it is true for both product innovations (such as the VCR. the micro~vave.and computer memo~"). and organizational breakthroughs (such as Henry Fords imento~-reduction methods m-idDcmln~'s statistical process control). Yet mother example is the case of programmable automation.
was invented in the US. but which has since diffused more widcl> in Europe and Japan.
This paper provides evidence that adversarial customer-supplier relationships are a tcchnolog \\ hlch a key fitctor m explaining the low rates of adoption of programmable equipment in the US. The paper examines the impact on adoption of computer numerically controlled (CNC) machine tools' of the relationship bet~~een components suppliers and theu customers in the automotive indust~.:
The paper is organized as follows. The first section reviews the literature to develop three explanations of the determinants of technolog adoption: efficiency. market power. and active customer commitment. The second section builds a model which includes each of the three explanations as special cases. The third section applies the model to CNC. and the fourth describes the data source. a swey of automoti~e suppliers which I conducted in 1989. and presents results t'romestimating the model. The 'A computer numerically-controlled (CNC3 machine tool is controlled by a single dedicated minicomputer or microcomputer.Computernumericalcontrol allows a machine tool to be programmed. in contrast to conventional mtichme tools, utuch are operated by rnachkists who control the tool through the uw LJf gears and cams. CNC tools can sigruticanti> increase productivity, quality, and product varie~.
[n a cmprehemive study of 2 I machining-intens~w industrws in the United States, Kelky and Brooks ( 19911 [', I,III(I[hot[n 1987 ,only 11YO d all machine tools m use \\ere proyrmunuhle and that only 430/0of fm had e~en onẽ) ll\\>uLcr-cunwlled tool. ForJapan theycitestudiesshowingthat 300/'of muchine tools in use in 1985 were programmable.
\Kclleyml Brooksestimatethis tigtae \vouldhave grmtn to W% by [987 ) EL@ustand Jacobsson ( 1988, p. 104 ) calcuk Fo;1984k number of cornputer+.ontrolkd(both NC and CNC) muchme WA per employee in engineering industries. thev tind the dmmy in Japan and Swedento be nearlv double hat oitie (JS. The t.iispantyin production is even greatff. by IWj Japanese output ot.computer-controlled mackine tools was 10~imesthat of lhe US (Ray, 1989) .
'Mxhinc.tool adoption involves tlvo sets of cust(mwrkpplkr rcldtmnsilips: between the component-maker 2ntl the In;ichine-t(wl vendor. und bc~~l een the automikr ontl k component-maker. This paper studies the second tylwL)( re!ationslup: see Kelky and Brooks ( 199I) tbr a discusswn of the relutmnsiup betweenmanufacturersandrnachlIw-IIxd vendors.
conclusion argues that bccausc of their effects on incentives to adopt new technology, supplier/customer rclatlouships play a key role in economic development,
Models of technology adoption
Much of the economics literature on technology adoption follows the approach de~elopedby ?vlanstield ( 1968. 1989) in arguing that firms adopt new technologies based on their expected profits from doing so. For example. Mansfield ( 1989) explains the difkion of industrial robots on the basis of differences in firms'estimates of their own profitability of adoption. (Mansfield Mansfield. argues that technology adoption is related to profitability. However, Griliches'smeasures are more closely related to the efficiency of adoption, which is not always correlated with the profitability of adoption by a user. For example, he uses yield improvements achievablewith hybrids in an area as a proxy for hybrid seeds' profitability to farmers. However, yield improvement affects the~producer and consumer surplus wailable to be divided among farmers. seed companies, and consumers. Each group's share will not automatically increase when total surplus increases.3
Many other studies of technology adoption have followed Griliches in assuming that a new technolo~will be adopted if and only if it leads to aa increase in total surplus. See for example the studies of adoption of NC machine took' done by Romeo ( 1975) and Globerman ( 1975) , and Oster's (1982) study of 'Use0[ hybrids changes the relative bargaining powa ot'farmers and seed compsrties. The reason is that once fanners su Itch to hybrids, they lose the abilityto producetheirownseedfinm the previousyear'scrop, because the otTspringof II}i-uidsckd are much less productive thannon-hybridizedcorn. Instead, farmers must buy seed every year bm oligopolistic seed cumptmics (Berlan and Lewontin, 1986 ). This situation is sn example of Williamson's (1985 p.63 ) "fundamental diffusion of the basic ox}gen furnace.
b. Market Po~~er.In contrast to the "efficiency"school discussed above. ability to appropriate profits pla>cd a central role m the \~or~of Joseph Schu.mpeter (1950) . In particular. he ar=izjcd that high market share alloltcd firms to be more in.no!ativc. because of their greater ability to reap pri~ate profit from their risk-taking behavior. Et idence that market polver affects the technolo~adoption decision is provided b> von Hippcl (1988) . tdlo finds in many industries that market share is a significant determinant of a firm'sdccislon to adopt a new technology. HaMart and McDoiveil ( 1984 a and b) find that banks in more concentrated morkls in the US are more likely to adopt automatic teller machines. while Espltia. Polo. and Saias ( 1991) c. Customer commitment. In the "market po~ver"tradition. relationships between customer and supplier firms are impersonal and ann's-length. In contrast. Ronald Dore ( 1983 Dore ( . 1986 ) has argued that one of the keys to Japanese success has been their use of "relational contracting". where "trading relations [are treated as] particularistic personal relations". in~vhichboth parties have an obligation to maintain the stability of the relationship. rather than deal with the firm that offers the best deal at the moment. Dore argues that the greater securih and trust involved in such relations leads to more in~estment and a more rapid flow of information ( 1983. pp.464.475) .
E\idcnce for this approach is provided by Kelley( 1993) . Nho his that fmns~~hosecustomers provide them Ivith technical information are more likely to adopt programmable automation. including CYC.
Lane ( !991 ) sho~vsthat US coal companies which are vertically integrated with their customers are more Iikcly to adopt continuous mining machines. The MIT Commission on Industrial Productivity (Dertouzos. Lester. and Soiow. 1989 ) and Piore and Sahel ( 1984) hare both pointed to adversarial supplier/customer relationships m a factor~vhichhas hindered US competiti~eness. Carisson and Jacobsson ( 1994) explain the high rate of adoption of flexible automation by Strcdish firms as in part due to close supplier/customer Iinklgcs.
Oliver Williamson ( 1975 Williamson ( . 1985 look at how the nature of contracts between firms affects their ln~cstment In specific assets. While Williamson does not explicitly consider the determin~ts of tech.nolog adoption. his theo~can be readily applied to the case of investment in a specific asset tvhich embodies nelt cchnolog \Villiamson points out that conditions such as asset specifici~. bounded rationali~. uncertain:.
and opportunism lead to increases in the costs of c~ing out transactions using markets. These costs ma! bc high enough to discourage parties whose relationship is governed by a market from making efficient in~estments.
For example. Monteterde and Teece ( 1982) show that automakers tend to vertic~lly integrate the production of parts characterized by asset specifici~. The authors explain this preference for vertical integration on the basis of the difficulty of designing the complex contingent contracts necess~to carq out an arrns'-length markt transaction. If there arises a situation unforeseen by the contract, a party~~hichhas invested in an asset~vhichis specific to another firm is wlnerrible to a "hold-up", in which the other fm reneges on its promise to provide a competitive returrt, since the investment is now Sunk.s Transaction-cost theorists assume that although it is theoretically possible that contracting arrangements~villdeter investment. institutional arrangements will in practice adjust so that parties have the incenti~e to invest efficiently. In the case above. Monteverdeand Teece aw.une that fms choose the le~elof Jertical integration so as to produce the socially-efficient amount of asset specificity.6That is. \vhile markets ma>'fail. o~erall economic organization does not.
'A correlationbetweenassetspecificity and vertical intqration is also found in econometric work by Joskow ( 1985) , ml . Acorrelationbetweenassetspedcity and conkact length or other safeguards is repofied by Joskow I,i ')s7I. und HeIdeand John ( 19823) . These authorsinterpret their tiiings as support for the transaction-cost prediction that m exogenouslevelof assetspecificity leads to modifications in governance mechanisms. % contras~Crandall (1968)arguesthat [JS automakerschose inefficientlyhigh levelsot'assetspecificiq,so as to reduce I.Ixsw (Jt' the marlw[fora giventypeoi replacement part. By designing a Chevrolet alternator to be incompatible \vith a Pontiac alkmalor, for example, General Motorscould decrease tbe likelihood that an independent firm could enter the rcpkcnkmt ultcmatormarketat ctlicwntscale. Consider first a discrete version of the model in Tirole ( 1988. pp,22-7) . In contrast. it is socially optimal to invest as long as (3) V-C>I.
Since a < = 1. the supplier will not invest in some projects Nhich arc socially optimal. [n contrast. If the supplier and the customer sign a long-term contract in period I (before the supplier invests). the supplier 11III invest as long as
\vhich is optimal because(4) is satisfied if~d oniy if G) is satisfied.
In the case of the short-term contract. the supplier underin~ests because it bears all of the costs of the investment. but receives only a of the returns In contrast-under a Iong-term contract the supplier pays a of the costs and receives a of the returns. In the general case. the supplier receives a of the benefits and pays a different proportion (y) of the costs:
Why would a customer not offer a contract such that a = y if this arrangement is necess~for efficient m~estrnent? One reason is that a customer~vitholigopoly rents may prefer inefficient short-tetm supplier rekmonshlps to Iong-temncontracts. if a long-term contract makes it possible for the supplier to gmn a larger share of the oligopoly rents.
We can extend the model above to show conditions under which bargaining-power considerations preclude efficient contracts.-Suppose the customer reaps oligopoly rents, F, in its futal-product market.
Suppose also that the customer incurs a cost of s~vitchingGom one supplier to another.s
As long as the switching costs are greater than zero, the customer must give the supplier access to a share of its oligopoly rents if a long-term contract is signed. The reason is that the supplier can now-holdup the customer if unforeseen contingencies arise during the contract period. For example, if the customer wants to change the specifications of the supplier's component (a common occurrence in the auto industry), the suppIiercan refuse to renegotiate the agreement unless it is paid handsomely for its trouble. The customer could compensate for this later loss of bargaining power by requiring the supplier to bid for the right to obtain a long-term contract. However. I show below that in the presence of supplier uncertainty about the size of the oligopoly rents. there may be no mutually-acceptable bid due to adverse selection.
The model has two time periods, In the auction periocLthe customer accepts bids for the right to a long-term contract. [f agreement is reached. the supplier makes the investment and the patties divide the mutual gain (v-c-1)as well as the customer's oligopoly ren~F. In the auction period. we treat the sharing parameters. a, and w,, as fixed. [n the production period which follows. we determine a endogenously.
'This section dralvs on Helper and Levine (1992) .
8E\anlpks of switching costs would be the expenses of moving customer-owned tooling fYomone supplier to anothec establishing communications link trainingsuppliersto use thecustomer's proceduresfor&ks suchas quali@ing tirrns u ho supplvequipmentandmaterials,or documentingquality-assurance efforts.Thesecostsmaybe quitelow.However, M shmvnklmr. s~vitchmg costsrise if thecustomersips a long-termcontractwiththesupplier.
Assume the customer first privately obsenes F. ind then receives bids from suppliers for a contract under \\ hich the customer pays ( I-y) of the investment cost.~Suppose that conditions are such that suppliers \!ould not invest in the absence of a long-term contract'".The customer should accept a bid B if
ihere ( If many suppliers bid for the contract. then competition~vdldrive their expected profits from the irnestment to zero:
. the customer will not accept the supplier's bid unless (6) is satisfied. even if the relationshipspecitic rents are positive. The expected value of F given that the bid is accepted is
Note that suppliers'bids could be paid in kind. as m an otkr O("tiree"product design. Note also that if the supplier hus sutiicient market poww (a, is high enough). the customer u dl face swtchmg costs high enough to protect the suppller's investment even tvlthout a Iong-temttcontract.
'That is, suppose that a,(v-c+F)-I< a~. [t is straightforward to showthat Ifthe supplierwould invest without a kmgtcnn contract. the cwstomer cannot increase its protits by otknng a lung-term contract.
'iAthwrse selection precludesmanyetlicient barguns under more general assumptions concerning the distnbutwn d F. A umtomndisttibtttion implies that k absolute level ut'uncertain about the level of increasesas F.u increases. This lSintuiu~elyplausible. since the absolute level uf uncertainty w-rounding C.hqAer's product market rents is less than that surroundingGMs. As HelpuT andLeiine( 1992)show, F und(v-c-[) neednot be not additne forthe adverse-selccuon result to hold. tn a repeated game, the supplier would o~er time learn aboutthecustomer'sprcductmarketrents,alleviatingthe od~erse-wlectmn problem.On the otherhandthis knotiledgeis valuableand the rents are uncertain. making the value uf dw imtid contracteven more uncettain.This etkt increases the severity O(the initial adverse-selection problem. Therefore.
placing the model in a repeated-game context \vould not change the baste result that adverse selectionprecludes some etlicient transactions. Substituting (9) into (7) gi~es (10) B '(i+~,) (~-C)-(l+y)l.
The probability that the customer uill accept this bid is
If the relationship-specific rents are positi~e but small relative to the maximum final-product market rent F7,&, or the increase in the supplier's bargaining share (a, -u~, there is w bid \vhich is acceptable to both [he supplier and the buyer. and investment Jvdl be inefficiently low,'2
The auction stage took the bargaining power parameters a, and al as given. Following Shaked and Sutton ( 1984) . we derive et, and u, as the outcome of a noncooperative game that is played over real time during the production stage after the auction. The supplier obsetves F in the production period, so information is complete and symmetric. When the production period begins. the hvo players alternate in proposing how to divide the total rents horn the relationship. The other player may respond by either accepting the offer or making a counteroffer in the next period In order to eliminate fwst-mover advantages.
u c examine equilibrium as the time behveen successive offers approaches zero. Bargaining is costiy, in the sense that the present value of the surplus to be divided ftis by the factor (1-a) in each period th~t a~cm~m rate of decline of the surplus which occurs Kthe piayas twcdevotistg energy to k@.ming and t.hwefm are not paying full attention to produstis. As=une that the Customeris locked into bargaining tvith the suppkr K chose in the auction stage for either I periods (in the case of a long-term contract) ors pericds (if no long-term ccmtractis signed). Afler the lock-in period is over, the customer obtains the input at cost C (either by ruaking th~nart in-house. buying it on an arm's-lengthmarkeg or buying it flom another long-term supplier ._-I:Th~~~tit 'JC& omer who receives oligopolymrentswill rejeet some eff;cient contracts is robust to a varie~of qwciticatiom~kl~* nam.t' k suppliers. Forex~pk, he amI's-length market for inputs may be pert"kctlycompetitivẽ ltnplying a,= o). uc~%@icrs '"wbargain unc nL a [imc who must rapidly start up production).
Using backward induction. Shaiied and Sutton ( 1984) shoit that this game has a umque perfect equdibriu.m. in which
Thus. ( 13) and ( 14) describe the division of surplus assumed m the auction stage above. i~hcre rr~is the purchaser profit. and t = (1.s).By inspection. we can see that 1> s implies al > a,. Thus. the longer the customer is locked into bargaining with a particular supplier (e.g.. the longer the customer'scontract wlth the supplier). the greater the supplier's share of the surplus.
Investment in CNC and Customer/Supplier Relations
Compared to con~entional general-purpose machines. CNC offers greater labor productivih (since time spent repositioning the Ivork piece for different passes is greatly reduced), greater conformance qualih.
and the abilih to machine more complicated parts than a skilled machinist could. Compared with dedicated equipment. CNC offers faster set-ups. since only the program has to be changed--hard~vareis not affected.
( Romeo. 1975 : Noori. 1990 . pp.24-5: Kelley and Brooks. 1991 CNC machines ha~e been commerciall~a~ailable since the mid-1970s. However. a comprehensiw 1987 suney (Kellq and Brooks. 1991) of US metal-working establishments found that only 43'% of plants had e~en one computer-controlled machine tool. and that less than 1l% of the stock of machine tools in use \vas computer-controlled.
Wily have adoption levels been so low'?Belot~.1show that CNC investment in the auto indust.q tits the model of section 2 in that the investment is spccifit. and auto suppliers have the ability to holdup Lhcir customers.
EJcn though CNC equipment itself is general-purpose. if a firm or division has few mariwts. cm} addition to its fixed capital increases the firm'svulnerability to a "hold-up". instantaneously redeploy all its equipment were it to lose Ford as a customer,1d In contrast is a small Indiana stamping supplier I visited in 1989. According to the sales manager. the fum's role was "to keep the other suppliers honest": its contracts were at most one year long. Although the plant had a small tool room. the investment required to buy a CNC machine~vasout of the question: it took hvo years of scrounging for the firm to come up \vith the few thousand dollars necessary to hrnish a lunch room for the workers, so the! no longer had to eat at their machines (intemiew. July 1989).
An investment in CNC is large. so the increased vulnerability to hold-up is significant. First. the machines themselves are expensive. Noori(1990,p.25) estimates that conventional machine tools cost $ i0,000 to $30.000. \vhile NC costs $80.000 to !$150,000 and CNC costs $250,000 to $1,000,000. Using conventional 'The president of a small auto-parts tii made an analogy to the situation of an economist who goes into debt to take a mathematics course. Although math skills are generaL tltey don't allow the economist to teach in another field such as Qccoun[ing. and tk z &bt makes her mm-evulnerable to bankruptcy should the market for economists shrink (in[emiew ii IdI Gerald F%-Joqh PollakInc., July 1995).
'% return tbr t.k contrwx Tennecoagreedto 5'% annualpricereductions. Even though Tenneco'sannual volume of most t)1" [I w~dlawt SVstems itmakesishigh(inthetensofthousands), thefm preferredto producethesepartsusingCNC ra[her I-kII[LVdOUtO&tiOn fm=IXtd~: 1)abilityto machine more @mplex parts, 2) faster machining time per piece. and ) faster time to change over to another model. The latter consideration was important because of the need to produce in smallbatches,due to li-equentengineering changes and the tenets of the just-in-time philosophy (interviews, October 1988 ond October 1989 accounting methods. which do not take into accourtt the complementarities described below. the pa: back period is likely to be at least ten }ears ( Noori. 1990 ).
Second. the firm must make other irn"estmcntsto make the equipment investment pa~off. CNC requires emplo}ees to hme different skills--programming instead of manual dextenv Therefore. CXC programmers must either be hired [\fhich means the firm must search for personnel in a different labor market from that which it is used to). or trained (\rhich means the firm recurs trmning expenses. and 10SMCk se~ices of its skilled machinists during the training period).
Moreover. profitable use of CNC and other q-pes of flewble automation requires a different operations strategy. one which aims to create a "just-in-time" production en~ironment of small batch wzes and pressure for continuous impro~ement. Concomitantly. firms must change their marketing strate~: salespeople must learn a great deal about customers' needs. so that they can sell CNC'Scapabilities for product modification and customization.'S That is. investments in CNC are complementa~~vithinvestments in many other areas of the fm. in the sense of Mihgromand Roberts (1992. p.543). The result is that e~en If the senices of CNC-trained machinists could be bought and sold on an wrn's-lengthmarket. the firm~vould still need to make nonredeployable investments in coordinating their capabilities~vithother parts of the organization. such as the marketing and production control departments These expenditures make the firm's fixed costs much higher than they were with conventional machine took. These fixed costs mean that even though CNC incrcmes a firm'sflexibility by increasing the range of products it can offer. it also increases a firm'sexposure to risk 1s
How can relationships ;vith customers improve the prospects for CNC adoption'? The supplier needs "The preceding paragraphs are based on discussion with managers and v.'orkersat metalworking tirms. and Hannah R&titI.formerlyotthe MachineAcUonProj~a technicalassistaxe agency in Sprin@ield, MA. See also Kclleyand Brooks (1991).
'Vhese tirms are quatedependent on just a few cmtomers. The average fum in my sample sells over 60% of its output to the mxo industry (-IO%sell over 8 I% of their output to the automakers). Since the Japanese automakers Formeda negligiblepatt of the salesot'mostautosuppliers in the [IS m 1989, loss of one of the Big Three automakers as a customer would mean at least a 20°/0 loss of Ax. some assurance that customers will continue to purchase its products at a remunerative price for some length of [illle. So that it can reap at least a martiet rate of return on its investment. Customers can provide this commitment in several ways. including financial ties such as equity investment or long-term loans: long-tern contmcts: or by demonstration of a concern for its reputation for fair dealing. Commitment can also be protlded involuntarily. m~vhena customer faces an oligopolistic supply indust~. 1"
\lethods
We can use the model in section 2 to derive an estimating equation. Suppose that (v-c). the change m production cost associated with investing in CNC, is measured with error u,, which is IN(O.6 '). and is uncomclated with the disturbance of F. the customer's final-product market rent. Then the probability that the supplier tvill invest is (16) Pr(CNC=l) =j'.<.OPr (a, (v-c +u)>y I)* Pdy, where
That is. for any proportion y of the investment cost to be paid by the customer, the suppliers willingness to in~est depends on the probability that the investment will be profitable times the probability (P) that it J~ill obtain a contract that pays y of the cost. Summing over the possible values of y gives the overall probabiliq that supplier l~ill in~est. We interpret y = 1 as the case where no agreement is reached on a contract which \tould require the customer to pay for any part of the investment. In this case therefore, a, = a,. Equation ( 16) contains as special cases each of the technology-adoption models discussed in section 1. This formulation suggests the following h~~otheses:
.
The suodier is more Iikelv to invest in CNC if the efflciencv of CNC investment (v-c-I) is
'"The argumentis similar to Williamson'sdiscussion ot'"dedicated assets". whichare "discrete additions to generalized capucitywhich Nould not be put in place but for the prospect of selling a largeamountof productto a particularcustomer PrcmiMIIE iemunut.ionof the contract by the buyer would leave the supplier with a large overhang ot'capaci~that could be The~tiable also proxies for economies of scale in marketing: equipment~endors have to pa! fewer~isits "If one expects CNC use to be distributed uruformly across the popuhmon of machine tools, then tirms i~lth more machine tools should be more likely to have one Of tlwrn he compilter-c~lntroiled. To the extentthat z tirrn's sales are correlatwl \rith its numberof machineteds, the sales vantibk :s picking up only this scale factor. and does not contm III Lumntionabouteconomiesot scale.However,the salesdata ISn~pertectly correlated with number of machine tools. since large!"ms do not aluays have lots of mitchine toois--theu primap production acttvity may be something other than mwdcutting, such as forging or assembly. (Even If they are engaged in metal-wttmg, long production runs may make tiwi automation a cost-etkctive alternative to both CNC and conventwnal machme tools Authors such as Schumpeter ( 1950) argue that a firm's imovative behavior is affected by the sh~e of the gains from trade the supplier can appropriate. as well as by efficiency concerns. However, these authors focus on market power as the k~determinant of appropriability. They do not allow for the possibility that deals beh~een indi~idual suppliers and customers could resolve these problems. Implicitly they assume q I=O in (16), Here. a, depends on:
Stumlier's market share (SHARE). W%ena flu-m has a higher market share, its customer will have fe~ver altema[i~e sources of supply. so the firm can bargain for a bigger share of the benefits horn CNC adoption Sucmlier'sDercentof sales to auto indusm (AUTOI measures the extent of a fro's dependence on just three customers--the US-owned automakers~".A high value of AUTO means a fwmhas few alternative sources of demand. so that the firm is less likely to be able to replace lost orders quickly. Therefore, this variable should 1101 c a neyttive impact on the probttbiiiy of CNC adoption. '"GnlIches( 1957) givesa similarrationaleforhis h}~thesis that areas with larger farms were faster to adopt hybrid corn.
Ho\ve\er. this variablecouldalsobe includedin the supplier relations categoq+,because there exist institutional structures under which dis variable wouldnot be significant: cooperativesof smallfmns, wherevendorscouldmake one sales pitch m a group ot'cumpames. or government technical assistance programs targeted at smaUfm. "TeI\ US-ouned tirms had signitican[business with Japanese-owned automakers in 1989. Japanese transplant suppliers (ICSS than 12%ot'tie sample}did not *I1 to a sigruticantlyhigher number of automakers than their US-owned countwpafls.
C. .4 supplier will be more likely to invest in CNC if it has a high probability of active commitment (P) from an individual customer.:! This corrumtment IS measured b}: contract length (CONTRACT). .4 longer contract gl~es the firm a longer plcmnmg horizon. Important because of CNC'S long pa>bctck period and ties to other assets that are specific to just a fmvcustomers, Other"things equal. a longer contract increases the probabilih that the customer IIIll pa} I propomon greater than zero of the investment cost.
Equations ( 16) and ( 17) provide three I~aysto test the "acti~e corrumtment"h~-pothesls.First. [ estimate a probit equation using contract length as a proxy for P. Second. [ estimate ( 17) and ( 18) as a recursive system. Finally, I estimate (17) explicitly. using grid search to maximize the likehhood. [nte=watmg (17), the probability that CNC= I is
A customer will be more likely to accept a suppliers bid for a long-term contract (P will be higher) if its final product market rents are low. [n equation ( 18). a higher value of FWX reduces the~alue of P. because the customer~vantsto protect its ftnal-product market rents from the possibilih of hold-up b> suppliers. Ho\\ever. applying Schumpeterian reasoning to automakers as~vellas their suppliers. one sees that if profits are too IOJV. the automaker-s ability to credibly commit to pa>mg a high proportion of the cost of investing in the future \sill be reduced. Thus, \ve predict :
Customer's maximum return on assets, 1970 should enter the contract equation pos[ti~el~.
u bile the square of this variable (CROASQ) should enter negati~el}. 21Institutional factors other than customer/supplier relationships are otten Important in determining~doption rates. For example. Carlsscm and .lacobsson ( 1994) argue that adoption rates are determined by the entre "technological systcm". Inducing state-sponsored"bridginginstitutions", and a critical mass of using and supplying tii (See also Carlsson. 1995). Kclleyand Brooks (199 I) show that the internal urganizaticmof the tirm including the labor-management relationship. is also important. In this paper I will I-&us on customer/supplier relationships. I take into account internal orgamntlon indirecdy,in the sense that the need to change it {as described in wc[ion 2) adds to [he cost of CNC adoption and therefore to the advantagesOFcustomer comrmtnwnt. In the US uuto indusW,bridgingrestitutionswhichu'ould provide asswtancc in adopongCNC havebeen largely absent. and (2) members of the Motor and Equipment Manufacturers'Association who sell components directl~to the automakers. Thus. the smey was mailed to virtually ewry f~st-tier supplier to manufacturers of cars and light trucks in the United States. The target respondent was the divisional director of marketing at independent firms. and the divisional business manager or director of strategic planning at automaker components divisions. I seIected these individuals based on information gathered ilom field intewiews that they tvould have the broadest knowledge about both custotna relationships and about their firms'products ;I]ldprocesses. These individuals had a great deal of experience in the industry; they had been with their firm for a median of 9~ears. and in the auto indushy for 11.
Because many companies supply their customers with several different~~es of products. and their rel~ticmships~ĩth their customers differ by product. respondents we asked to am'er tie swv for O= customer using w product tvhich~vas~-pical of their company'soutput. In order to presene confidentiality and to minimize the time required to till out the survey, respondents were not asked to provide exact data on their firm's sales. etc. but rather to check boxes indicating ranges.
The response was double the norm for business surveys: 499 filled-out questionnaires were received. fo~a response rate of 47'!40. Furthermore. responses from the four major groups who received the suw--automaker components divisions. Japanese-owned frets. MEMA members (who tend to be small and medium-sizcd independent firms). and large independent fro--were close to their proportions in the population, Table 3 shows support for all three h}Totheses in section 4. firms are more likel> to adopt CYC the higher the efficien~of CNC for their product. the greater their market potver. and the more customer cortunitment they receite. Maximizing the likelihood function implied by (19) yielded similar results. as shown in Table 5 . Howe\er. this technique did not produce a significant improvement in the log likelihood. and the results are difflcuh to interpret. so the rest of the discussion will focus on the probit results,
Column 3 of table 3 shows that efficiency. market polver. and acti~e commitment are dl important determinants of CNC adoption. In particular. the active commitment J mable CONTRACT is siqificant at better than the 1% level. As the first two columns of the table shol~. [he impact of the efficiency and market power variables does not change if these are considered separately from the active commitment variables
The McKelvcy-Zavoina pseudo-R2 for the "active commitment" model is .59. u In the reds repwted below, 213 respondentswere excluded because they did not know about the tectrnolo~. thought It was inapplicable to their business, or (in a & cases) had missing data. I also anahzed a data set in tvhich an wto technolo~expert judged that for thirty of these tirms. CNC is indeed appiicoble to the manufacture of the product these respondents imlicatal w'astypical of their business. '][n se~eral cases [ transfomned variables which originally had multiple levels into dummies. The rationale IS[hut respondents are more likely to be able to sort themselves accurately into tu'o -groups(high id low'sl.alltit adopting ncti process technolow. for example), than into tive. This procedure did not materially affect the results.
One explanation for these results is that commitm~ntdoes not cause CNC adoption: instead. both CYC adoption and commitment are dri~cn by a common third factor. such as being a "good" supplier. [n table 3 Ive hime controlled for this posslbilih by including the~ariable "HISKILL". which measures the supplier's skdl at introducing cntirel} new processes.
However. it may be objected that this skill ISso imperfectly measured that the commitment \ cmablcs are picking up some of the taricmce that~~ouldbe attributed to a properly measured skill iwiable, A c!oser look at Table 3 provides one anslver to this objection: the coefficient on HISKILL actually rises when commitment tm-iables are included. [f the commitment variables \vere merely proxies for unmeasured skill.
then their omission should cause the coefficient on HISKILL to jump. Table 4 provides more etidence that the commitment variables do have an impact on investment independent of their comection Jvithefficiency. The fiist column presents estimates of CONTRACT using a linearized~ersion of equation ( 18).~vherea,, the supplier'sbargaining share with a long-term contract. is treated as a constant. Both CROA and CROASQ are significant in this equation. This result is consistent l~ith the h~~othesis that customers are motivated not only by efficiency criteria in offering contracts to their suppliers. but also by concerns to protect their fiial-product market rents. These results are robust to a \ arieõ f specifications: using the average return on assets (rather than the maximum); omitting outliers (Toyota Ilad on a~erage return on assets of 40% and a maximum retmrnof 65?/o);using customer dummies rather than customer ROA: and including dummies for Japanese-owned and automaker-owned supplier plants.
I then calculate CONTRACT (EST) by subtracting out that part of the variance of CONTEL4CTdue to the ctTiciencyvariables. Even after adjusting the standard errors, CONTRACT (EST) remains highly significant. again indicating that contract len@h is not just a proxy for unobserved variables measuring the efficiency of CNC adoption.
These results are also robust. In particular. controls for vertical integration are not statistically significant. .In transaction-cost models. integration is an organizational form which prevents "hold-ups" 19 ~vtuchcan occur where specific assets and UrtcertainE/cornplexlh mc present. In the ctment framework. integration might be interpreted as a measure of customer commitment. since in practice. it holl~-oi~ncd divisions are hard for corporations to divest (Helper. [99 lb~Holfe~cr. VI is not sl~lficant. irith or u Ithout \ariabics it hich might bc correlated Iwth~erticd integration (?JE\V..\UTO. and CO~lpLEX):' For those uneasy w'ithsubjective evalwmons. it ISperhaps comforting to note that on]: t\\o of lhc variables (CO MPLE.X m-idHIS KILL) are subjectnel}" measured. LeaI ins them out has no impact on the result that market power and active customer commitment are correlated u lth CNC adoption.
Conclusion
These results allotv us to reject the null h~-pothesisthat relationships bet~~eensuppliers and their customers do not hale an important impact on suppliers'decision to ln~est In flexible aulomatlon, The "market potver" and "active commitment" variables turn out to be an important addition to the "efficiency>" variables commonly specified in technology adoption models. In fact. tires for Nhorn CNC Nas technicallẽ fficient~vouldbe unlikelv to adoot the technolo~in the absence of customer commitment. That is. those firms~vhichwere new auto suppliers. paid high~~ages. had high skill at process innovation. a complex product. and a small batch size but had no customer commitment hod onl~a 48% chance of adopting the technolo~. If these firms were to be gi~en a one->ear contract b~thclr customer. the probabiliq of odoption Jvould rise to 62°/0. If all variables are evaluated at their means. a six-month increase in contract !ength produces a !7 percentage-point increase in CNC adoption. Similarly. a ten percentage-point increase in market share produces an 11-percentagepoint increase in the rate of CNC adoption.
These results have implications for both thco~wtd policy. On the theoretical front. the paper shous that it is important to integrate questions of itppropriabilih into the technical change literature. in particular b: adding supplier rchttions as a determinant of tcclmoioa adoption. Second. the paper extends transaction-'Wonewvertically-integrated divisiomwwecreatedin [he 1980s.w NEW is zerowhatever VIis one.Onemightthink. on transactwn-costgrounds.that high levelsd AUTO imdCOMPLE.Y tiouid be correlatedwith lugh Ietels ot'wet specltici~. md thereioretvith~wlicalintegration. cost analysis. b~rela..ing the assumption that agents'privite maximizing behavior~vdl al~vays produce orgmmtional forms that maximize social efticienc} M \\ei].
This paper has found tlvo hTes of customerlsupplier relationships that enhance the adoption of capital-intensl~e imovations. First. market power helps to ensure appropriabili~. ixen on atomlsuc markets.
by reducing customers' abilit? to exit from a supplie~s. Second. active commitment by indit Idual customers.
either in the form of trust}~orthybeha~lor or Iong-term contracts. allows suppliers to plan on haJ mg the high capacih utilization needed to cover CNC'Shigher fixed costs. Even though CNC is a general-purpose technolo~in the abstract. it becomes a specific asset when adopted by a firm whose sales are limlted to a fe~v customers. since it adds to the firm'ssunk costs. Therefore, explicit commitments from customers can increase the expected return on such an imestment by reducing the risk of a hold-up.
These results have policy implications as well. The implication of an inefficiently 10MCNC adoption rate is that US auto suppliers will have longer production runs (less ability to produce a varieh of products at a point in time. and less ability to quickly and continuously improve products) and lower quality than they would othenvise. This inflexibility~villnegatively affect US suppliers to the auto indus~, In addition. Iouer equipment irt~estment~villreduce economic growth: DeLong and Summers ( 1991) fmd that an extra 1?4 of GNP in~estcd in equipment is associated \\ith increased G.P. growth of.3 percentage points. They estimate that the social rate of return on equipment investment in well-fimctioning market economies is on the order of 300/0per year.
One implication of the foregoing analysis is that a customer fro's purchasing policies have longwm effects. By infhencing the incentives of the supplier base to invest in new technologies. these policies affect customers' ability to c~out their strategies--and thereby, national competitiveness.
:<![lWl]llamsonlan ]anWage ( [985~, 195) ,~~utom~m who specfies tie me of a partwhich can be made only by a t~tt wqq-diers has created a hostage, a "separate but concurrent investment in spectiic assets" which bidanccs the supplier's mtewnentintie dedicatedassetd CNC. Furadditional empiricalevidence on tlus issue of "dependence balancing". see He]de m.t John. 1988 
